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Introduction  
 
While the rise of Islamic terrorism receives a significant portion of the attention, Northern 
Europe has – for decades – dealt with a rising tide of neo-Nazis, neo-fascists, and other white 
power movements. The threat grew to such an extent in the mid-1990s that there was an 
understanding by both governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that these 
 
1 This article was adapted from a chapter from “Disengagement, Deradicalization, and Counter-Radicalization: 
An Examination of Global Programs to Address Extremism”, a thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University. 
2 Corresponding Author Contact: Casie Daugherty, Email: casieed@gmail.com,  1801 K Street NW, Suite 900, 
Washington, DC 20006 Twitter: @CasieDaugherty, LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/casie-daugherty-
6a2a142b/  
Abstract 
Though the study of deradicalization is relatively new, in the last several decades 
many countries have undertaken the task of building programs within the space to 
address the growing threat of extremism and radicalization – both from a religious 
and political perspective. This paper examines the birth of deradicalization 
programs in Norway and Sweden, which were two of the first – if not the first – 
countries to create holistic programmatic approaches to tackling disengagement 
and deradicalization. Both of these programs sprang up in the mid-to late 1990s 
and were tasked with growing far-right extremist groups. The paper outlines the 
opportunities and challenges that facet of the program presented and if and how 
they were able to adjust. Finally, the paper looks at the data collected by each 
program, specifically on the number of their participants and if they remained 
separate from radical ideologies to determine if the programs were success and 
similar programs could be replicated and expect similar successes. 
With the resurgence of white power and Neo-Nazi extremism across Europe and 
the United States, a consideration of the programs developed in Sweden and 
Norway two decades ago may provide a replicable template for current issues with 
extremism. 
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groups and their ideologies were becoming a serious domestic threat. In countries like 
Norway and Sweden, these ideologies had permeated a substantial portion of the population 
in the early twentieth century and were not completely eradicated with the defeat of Nazi 
Germany after World War II. Although many of the groups professing these beliefs were 
forced underground in the intervening decades, the ideologies still attracted a number of 
devoted followers. This article will look at the precipitating factors that led to the 
disengagement and deradicalization programs in Norway in Sweden; the relationship between 
the programs in both countries, including significant differences between them; and the long-
lasting effects of the programs in each country.  
Overall, the Exit programs in both Sweden and Norway have similar features, at least 
partially because they address similar ideologies. However, as Norway’s extremist population 
is very young, their program emphasizes parental involvement and early intervention by 
professionals in order to present differing life possibilities for these groups, whereas Sweden’s 
older population requires a programmatic structure dependent on proactive engagement from 
those individuals seeking to disengage and deradicalize. Sweden’s program also sets itself 
apart by its use of – and dependence on – the work of former neo-Nazis themselves to staff 
the program and coach the individuals who are attempting to leave violent, far-right 
extremism, which lends the program credibility but also presents challenges. While each 
program has demonstrated high success rates, more information is needed to determine 
whether those successes are sustained. Particularly in the case of Sweden, the country’s own 
legal data protections inhibit the ability to determine whether the program should be 
considered a success. The lack of data in both cases damages the ability to distinguish the 
features of each program that contribute most to its success, as well as its failures. 
 
Literature Review 
 
There is general agreement across geographic, demographic, and religious lines that 
extremism is a significant global issue and has been for several decades. However, there is 
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less agreement about what should be done to rehabilitate those that have undergone 
radicalization; what constitutes rehabilitation; and the more general question of whether it is 
even possible to deradicalize and rehabilitate a former extremist.  
While the attention on deradicalization programs, as well as the growth of countries 
that have adopted such programs are relatively new, the ideas behind them are not, as this 
paper will detail. One of the first deradicalization study was released in 1988 and focused on 
individuals who had left and renounced their ties to Neo-Nazism in the United States; 
however, unlike concerted efforts to institute deradicalization programs, the individuals 
included in this study had “voluntarily disaffiliated themselves” from their radical groups.3  
 
Concept of Deradicalization 
When looking at deradicalization as a theory, some scholars are quick to separate the 
concept of deradicalization from the concept of disengagement because, in their view 
someone committed to a radical ideology can be disengaged from committing acts in the 
name of that ideology without being persuaded away or renouncing their beliefs. John Horgan 
and Kurt Braddock make the argument that deradicalization implies changing at the cognitive 
level with a “long-lasting change in orientation such that there is presumably a reduced risk of 
re-engaging in terrorist activity” while disengagement can be classified as something as small 
a change in roles with an organization or movement.4 However, in an earlier piece of work, 
Horgan and Braddock were definitive in their refutation that “desistance from terrorism 
requires a change in attitudes to precede a change in behavior.”5 However, Kruglanski, 
Gelfand, and Gunaratna say that in many deradicalization programs, disengagement provides 
the backbone for deradicalization as these programs “stress disengagement from violence and 
 
3 James A. Aho, "OUT OF HATE: A SOCIOLOGY OF DEFECTION FROM NEO-NAZISM," Current 
Research on Peace and Violence 11, no. 4 (1988). 
4 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of 
De-radicalization Programs,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 22 (2010). 
5 John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, “Assessing the Effectiveness of Current De-Radicalization Initiatives and 
Identifying Implications for the Development of U.S.-Based Initiatives in Multiple Settings,” College Park: 
START (2009), https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/De-
radicalization%20Programs%20Final%20Report.pdf.  
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alternative methods of redressing the alleged grievance, rather than denying the validity of the 
grievance.”6  
 
Deradicalization Programs 
Within the literature focusing on deradicalization, some scholars interchangeably use 
the terms “disengagement” and “deradicalization,” which for the purposes of this paper do not 
mean the same things, and when used synonymously can lead to improper conclusions as the 
authors of “Disengagement from Ideologically-Based and Violent Organizations: A Systemic 
Review of Literature” point out.7 Establishing that a subject’s disengagement from a group – 
by whatever metrics that is judged on – does not mean that they no longer hold a particular 
belief system, which could lead to their reengagement.  
 
Significance Quest Theory and the Development of Deradicalization Programs 
The successful development of deradicalization – and disengagement – programs are 
built on an understanding of why individuals radicalize in the first place. In the last decade a 
considerable percentage of scholarship on radicalization, and in turn, deradicalization, has 
focused on the understanding of the psychology of individuals that have undergone 
radicalization processes. The “quest for significance” has been identified as a “fundamental 
human motivation by many psychological theorists” for decades, dating back to Abraham 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs in the early 1940s.8 Arie Kruglanski has done significant work 
around this topic, and his assertions of the concept of a “significance quest” that propels 
suicidal terrorism form the basis of much of the other theoretical discussions and research in 
 
6 Arie Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, and Gunaratna, “Aspects of Deradicalization, “Aspects of 
Deradicalization.” Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict. 12 January 2011, 
http://www.asymmetricconflict.org/articles/aspects-of-deradicalization/. 
7 Steve Windisch, Pete Simi, Gina Sott Ligon, and Hillary McNeel, “Disengagement from Ideologically-Based 
and Violent Organizations: A Systemic Review of Literature,” Journal for Deradicalization 9 (2017): 4. 
8 Arie W. Kruglanski and Edward Orehek, “The Role of the Quest for Personal Significance in Motivating 
Terrorism,” In The Psychology of Social Conflict and Aggression, edited by Joseph P. Forgas, Arie W. 
Kruglanski, and Kipling D. Williams, New York: Psychology Press, 2011, 154.  
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this field.9 The significance quest theory “affords an integration of seemingly disparate 
motivational contexts of suicidal terrorism involving personal traumas, ideological reasons, 
and social pressures,”10 that can help to lay the foundation for how to deradicalize an 
individual. For practical purposes, having a broad theoretical understanding for radicalization 
allows for the design of deradicalization programs that can address more factors for 
radicalization than programs that assume a limited cause for radicalization.  
 
Program Standards and Ingredients for an Effective Program 
Across scholarship, there is general agreement that a successful deradicalization 
program hinges on delegitimizing either the group or narrative – sometimes both – to which a 
terrorist identifies. Koehler also points out the importance of systematically dismantling “the 
previously learned radical ideology.”11 Further, as Koehler discusses, the “nature, scope, and 
structure” of deradicalization programs is largely dependent on a number of different aspects 
including the target, goals, and standards.12 Emilio Viano argues that prevention “should be 
limited and carefully focus on people who are reasonably suspected of intending to commit or 
directly facilitate violence, or those who are clearly targets of recruitment efforts”.13  
Determining the effectiveness of a program can be done in a number of different ways 
and the literature on these accountability tools is often highly subjective. Across countries and 
cultures there is general agreement amongst researchers that these programs have “no 
 
9 Arie W. Kruglanski, Xiaoyan Chen, Mark Dechesne, Shire Fishman, and Edward Orehek, “Fully Committed: 
Suicide Bombers’ Motivation and the Quest for Personal Significance,” Political Psychology 30, no. 3 (2009): 
335.  
10 ibid, 348. 
11 Daniel Koehler, “De-radicalization and Disengagement Programs as Counter-Terrorism and Prevention Tools. 
Insights From Field Experiences Regarding German Right-Wing Extremism and Jihadism,” in Countering 
Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Among Youth to Prevent Terrorism, ed. M. Lombardi, et al., Burke: IOS 
Press, 2015. 
12 ibid 
13 Emilio Viano, “Investigating and Preventing Terrorism in Multicultural Urban Settings: Is a Balanced 
Approach Possible,” in Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism Among Youth to Prevent 
Terrorism, ed. M. Lombardi, et al., Burke: IOS Press, 2015, 3. 
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established criteria of success and no standards” that apply universally.14 Daniel Koehler cites 
the “establishment of transparent standards and legally sound guidelines regarding the data” 
as one of the “most important aspects” of a deradicalization program but cautions that the 
“least effective way of maintaining the programmes’ credibility and benefit from the counter-
terrorism potential of these initiatives” is through “mandatory information sharing, as well as 
compulsory participation.”15  
There is widespread disagreement about almost every part of these programs, from 
who runs them to who refers the individuals targeted for deradicalization. Are non-
government entities likely to refer individuals in their communities for deradicalization to 
programs in which government law enforcement agencies are heavily involved? Does that 
make these programs automatically less effective because they are viewed skeptically by the 
communities that could be key to making them successful? 
Additionally, there are questions about the reliance on self-reported successes and 
recidivism rates that are often used to determine if a program is effective. Tom Pettinger 
delves into several known examples of questionable statistics, including “startlingly… low 
rates of recidivism” by programs in Germany, Mauritius, and Saudi Arabia.16 For scholarship 
that is already divided on if and how to judge the effectiveness of these programs, having 
statistics that are unreliable exacerbates questions on the efficacy of these programs.  
 
Defining Success 
Unfortunately, there is little agreement on a collective framework for “determining 
what constitutes effectiveness or success.”17 Horgan and Braddock’s 2009 work, which 
examines seven countries as individual case studies, also points out that no country has 
 
14 Richard Barrett and Laila Bokhari, “Deradicalization and rehabilitation programmes targeting religious 
terrorists and extremists in the Muslim world: An overview,” In Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and 
collective disengagement, Edited by Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan, New York: Routledge, 2009, 179. 
15 Daniel, Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, tools and programs for countering violent 
extremism, New York: Routledge (2017), 102. 
16 Tom Pettinger, “De-radicalization and Counter-radicalization: Valuable Tools Combating Violent Extremism, 
or Harmful Methods of Subjugation?” Journal for Deradicalization 12 (Fall 2017): 11. 
17 ibid 
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attempted to “identify valid and reliable indicators of successful de-radicalization… [thus] 
any attempt to objectively evaluate the effectiveness any such program is beset with 
difficulties.”18 Additionally, as many of the countries who have deradicalization programs are 
less than transparent with their data, scholars are forced to rely on information that cannot be 
independently corroborated.  
Additionally, as much of the scholarship mentions, success is often measured in 
recidivism rates. This in and of itself presents a problem because recidivism can only be 
measured after a participant’s release, and can often occur years, if not decades later. 
Additionally, as Porges and Stern point out, recidivism rates are often dependent upon 
intelligence services to track those who have participated, which often present an entirely 
different set of problems.19 
 
Methodology and Limitations 
 
This paper uses two case studies to evaluate their relevant deradicalization programs using a 
qualitative approach. Where available, government-provided data is used to evaluate 
characteristics of populations that would likely be at risk for radicalization; who is being 
evaluated as a candidate for deradicalization; enrolled in a deradicalization program; and the 
outcomes for individual participants. In some instances, government data sets were available 
only through reporting by media outlets; in those instances, when reported by multiple 
reliable sources, they are included. When evaluating the failures of deradicalization programs, 
individual examples were culled from newspapers and scholarly publications, as in many 
cases, privacy laws required government data sets to remove personally identifiable data.  
The details of the deradicalization programs were taken from government documents, 
news reports, and descriptions from officials who were either involved in their creation or are 
 
18 ibid 
19 Marisa L. Porges and Jessica Stern, “Getting Deradicalization Right,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2010, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2010-05-01/getting-deradicalization-right.  
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involved in their day-to-day operations. In many cases, there remain details of the programs 
that are unknown. Where that is the case, the lack of information is noted.  
When necessary, open sourced translations of official documents and news reports 
were used to clarify and/or verify information. In these cases, translations were checked by 
multiple sources to ensure accuracy. In the places where necessary, English translations of 
this data are used throughout the paper. 
 
Norway and the Birth of EXIT Programs 
 
The strength and power of the far-right, skinhead movement reached its peak in Norway 
between 1995 and 1996. Although the exact number of participants is unknown, experts 
believe that some 100-300 Norwegians were actively involved in these groups. Clearly, as a 
proportion of the overall population, involvement in these groups was not overwhelming, 
their propensity for violence, which had been demonstrated on a host of occasions, including 
some described above, was a growing issue.  
The problem had become pressing and the need for some action obvious. In February 
1995, 78 members of far-right extremist groups were arrested in the Torshov district of Oslo 
at one of their hangouts called Nationalist House.20 Police raided the house after the 
extremists began shooting at anti-racist protestors and found a large cache of weapons and 
extremist propaganda.21 This mass arrest, which was followed by several more in 1995 and 
1996, revealed a shocking truth.22 The vast majority of the arrestees were young – often under 
the age of 13 – and their parents were completely unaware of their participation in these 
radical groups.  
Instead of continuing to bury their heads in the sand, in 1995 these parents sought 
 
20 Prosjext Exit: Sluttrapport [Project Exit: Final Report], Oslo: Organisasjonen Voksne for Barn, 2000, 19. 
https://docplayer.me/1333874-Prosjekt-exit-sluttrapport.html#show_full_text  
21 ibid 
22 Tore Bjørgo, “Exit Neo-Nazism: Reducing Recruitment and Promoting Disengagement from Racist Groups,” 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt), no. 627, June 2002, 18. 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/27380/627.pdf  
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assistance from a unit of the Manglerud police department that was devoted to violence and 
crime prevention; further, they pooled their resources and “established parental network 
groups” to aid their children’s disconnection from these groups.23 These networks proved to 
be so effective in convincing these young people to leave these groups, that according to 
researchers, within months almost all the children of these parents had disengaged.24 There 
are not exact numbers, however, nor does their appear to be data on the disengagement rates 
for children whose parents were not involved in the parental networks nor for older 
participants.  
However, these parental networks served as the basis for more formal programs 
devoted to assisting parents to extract their children from similar groups. Parents reached out 
to Tore Bjørgo, a noted researcher in Norway on racist violence and youth participation in 
radical groups on how best to improve their efforts.25 Bjørgo was, at the time, one of the 
leading researchers into violence committed by right-wing extremist groups, as well as what 
draws young people into joining these groups. His theory – quite different from many other 
researchers – was that people don’t join extremist groups because they “hold extremist 
views,” rather, “they often acquire extremist views because they have joined the groups for 
other reasons.”26 
In conjunction with the Manglerud officers who had assisted in earlier efforts for 
disengaging the youth participants, Bjørgo began to create a more formal program in 1996. 
That same year, the government convened a group of experts focused on right-wing 
extremism – the Interdisciplinary Advisory Service for Local Action against Racism and 
Xenophobia, which included some of the most respected experts in the area.27 Among the 
 
23 ibib  
24 ibid 
25 ibid, 19.  
26 Tina Wilchen Christensen, “How extremist experiences become valuable knowledge in EXIT programmes,” 
Journal for Deradicalization 3, (Summer 2015): 103. 
27 Froukje Demant, Marieke Slootman, Frank Buijs, and Jean Tillie, Teruggang en uittreding: processen van 
deradicalisering ontleed [Decline and Disengagement: An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation], 
Amsterdam: IMES (2008), 158. 
https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/1079141/64714_Demant_Slootman_2008_Decline_and_Disengagement.pdf 
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participants was Randi Talseth, the Secretary General for Adults for Children; Tore Bjørgo, 
who at the time was a researcher at the Norwegian Institute of international affairs; Magnus 
Betten, Bjørn Øvrum, and Petter Bærum from the Manglerud Police; Beate Kaupang from the 
Vestford County Council; Terje Bang from the Church City Mission in Tønsberg; Nina 
Solberg from Sirvente, a professional services company; and Else Berg Løland, the Regional 
Director for Adults for Children in Kristiansand.28   
The group was specifically designed to assist local municipalities in addressing their 
right-wing extremism problem when it arose, allowing for the proliferation of best practices 
that could be used across the country as needed.  Because it was created with an eye toward a 
local problem, the program formulated by Bjørgo and the Manglerud police became one of 
the group’s key components.   
 
28 Prosjext Exit: Sluttrapport, 20. 
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SOURCE: TORE BJØRGO, “EXIT NEO-NAZISM: REDUCING RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTING DISENGAGEMENT FROM RACIST 
GROUPS.” 
Additionally, the Norwegian government was finally able to take a more proactive 
approach to addressing the problem of right-wing radicalism and participation in extremist 
skinhead groups. In 1997, the program was granted three-years of funding by the Ministry of 
Justice, Ministry of Children, and the Directorate of Immigration and was hosted by the 
Adults for Children NGO. The program was christened Project Exit – Leaving Violent Youth 
Groups and had three main objectives, as demonstrated in Figure 1.  
 
PROJECT EXIT AND ITS OBJECTIVES (FIGURE 1)29 
 
 
 
In keeping with the mission of the Interdisciplinary Advisory Service for Local Action 
against Racism and Xenophobia, Project Exit focused on working at the local level – 
empowering officials with best practices, rather than building an entirely different system by 
which to address the youth involvement. A considerable part of the program was devoted to 
training those that would regularly come into contact with individuals that were actively 
involved in the far-right groups, as well as those that were at risk of falling into those groups. 
According to Project Exit data, the program trained some 700 professionals, including 
 
29 Bjørgo, “Exit Neo-Nazism: Reducing Recruitment and Promoting Disengagement from Racist Groups,” 19.  
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“teachers, local youth workers, police agents,”30 to carry out the mission of Project Exit.  
As previously described, when Norway decided to tackle its neo-Nazi program in the 
mid-1990s, the vast majority of participants in these groups were very young and in many 
ways exhibit the same characteristics of youth across the world that are at risk of becoming 
involved with violent ideologies. Members of the far-right groups were often poorly educated, 
having “only achieved basic vocational training” and are, in some way, experiencing “social 
and societal problems.”31 The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), who are involved 
with monitoring and identifying members and groups within this ecosphere, also state that 
members “lack a social safety net” and have sometimes had “violent confrontation with a 
group of young immigrants” that causes them to seek solace in groups espousing ideologies 
against these groups.32  
According to Adults for Children, youth were often initially drawn to these extremist 
groups not for their ideologies but for the groups themselves. They are looking for a place to 
belong with individuals of a similar age that have shared experiences, and neo-Nazi groups 
give them all of that. When helping youth to deradicalize and disengage ideology may often 
be a secondary factor in participation in these groups; “the majority” of extremists who 
participated in Neo-Nazi groups in Kristiansand “had only a superficial and fragmentary 
picture of racist ideology… [and] the group mostly provided a strong group identity.”33 While 
some are drawn to the violence because they are true believers in the white supremacist 
thought, most are not. Therefore, Project Exit had to be developed in such a way to address 
the primary reasons that individuals joined these groups, not simply focused on combatting 
the ideology.  
 
Parental Networks as an Integral part to Project Exit 
As Project Exit grew out of parental networks that were devoted to helping their 
 
30 Demant, Slootman, Buijs, and Tillie, 158. 
31 ibid 
32 ibid, 160.  
33 Ibid, 163 
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SOURCE: TORE BJØRGO, “EXIT NEO-NAZISM: REDUCING RECRUITMENT AND PROMOTING DISENGAGEMENT FROM 
RACIST GROUPS.” 
children leave neo-Nazi groups, these networks remained an integral component to Exit. 
According to Bjørgo, parents are “in a central position to influence… their children’s 
behavior,” and parents of teenagers can often benefit from networks of other parents in similar 
situations.34 Parents, and subsequently their children who are involved in extremist activity, 
have been shown to benefit from participation in a parental network as described in Figure 2. 
Perhaps for than anything, these parental networks provide a bonding and information sharing 
space, where parents are not saddled with the embarrassment and shame that often comes with 
a child participating in extremist behavior. Rather, these spaces allow parents to develop 
connections with others in similar circumstances and to learn from their shared experiences. 
The parental networks also provide a conduit for outside experts to receive and share 
information that can be utilized immediately, as there are no bureaucratic layers to wade 
through.     
 
BENEFITS OF PARENTAL NETWORKS (FIGURE 2) 35 
  
 
 
34 Bjørgo, “Exit Neo-Nazism: Reducing Recruitment and Promoting Disengagement from Racist Groups,” 19. 
35 ibid, 19-20.  
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However, there is a recognition that these parental networks are not sufficient in all 
cases. For example, some parents hold viewpoints similar to the extremist groups that their 
children are involved, while others are “afraid of being branded as bad parents” or are happy 
that their children have friends when they haven’t in the past and still others refuse to 
participate in talking about their familial issues in a group setting.36 In the cases where 
parental networks are not applicable, other aspects of the Exit program can be utilized; 
therefore, a young person is not left to the clutches of the group if parental support is not 
available. 
While there are some limitations to the parental networks, the data indicates that they 
are largely successful in disengaging young people from neo-Nazi groups. The parent-driven 
portion of Exit had a success rate of almost 90 percent37 when the project drew to a close – the 
result of the government deeming the problem of right-wing radicalism solved. Specifically, 
according to Bjørgo, around 130 parents participated in parental networks between 1995 and 
2000, with 100 children amongst them; and by the end of the five-year period, only 10 of 
those 100 children remained as a part of a neo-Nazi group.38 However, there is not even data 
to prove that the parental networks were the deciding factor in youth leaving extremist groups 
– or even a factor at all, though Bjørgo says that the parental networks made a “decisive 
impact in many cases.”39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 ibid, 21.  
37 Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Ellie B. Hearne, “Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalization and Disengagement from 
Violent Extremism,” International Peace Institute, 2008, 5. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-
content/uploads/publications/beter.pdf 
38 Bjørgo, “Exit Neo-Nazism: Reducing Recruitment and Promoting Disengagement from Racist Groups,” 21.  
39 ibid 
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Empowerment Conversations: Addressing Current Circumstances By Revisiting Needs and 
Wants 
While parental networks are key to Exit, they are not the sole component. Exit also 
incorporates what it refers to as “conversations” or “preventative talks” as a key element to 
the program. While the parental network portion of Exit – as well as participation in the 
overarching program – is not compulsory, if a person under the age of 18 is identified as 
being involved in criminal activity, participating in violent extremist organizations, or at risk 
of joining criminal organizations, these individuals and their parents are required to speak 
with the police if contacted. What is most notable about these conversations is that although 
the specific criminal act – in this case belonging to the right-wing extremist group – 
is the basis for the conversation, it is not the focus.40 Instead, using a “conversational tactic 
 
40 “Practical Guide to the Deradicalization of Youngsters,” FORUM, Institute for Multicultural Development, 
31. https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/?action=media.download&uuid=29B8D699-CC10-B759-
0CFD0E7FD2D77078  
THE EMPOWERMENT CONVERSATION 
(FIGURE 3) 
SOURCE: TORE BJØRGO, AND YNGVE CARLSSON “EARLY INTERVENTION 
WITH VIOLENT AND RACIST YOUTH GROUPS.” 
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called ‘The Empowerment Conversation’ which focuses on understanding the individuals’ 
goals and sense of self, and promoting a positive view of self,”41 police begin a conversation 
meant to understand and persuade, not necessarily enact punishment.  
Pioneered by Bjørn Øvrum, a preventative police officer, the Empowerment 
Conversation is best understood as a type of behavioral therapy that seeks to show a young 
offender that the path they are on could have significant negative consequences for whatever 
they hope to accomplish in the future, as well as to help that offender better understand how 
their current behavior can be explained.42 One of the most important portions of the 
Empowerment Conversation involves examining the behaviors and/or needs that led that 
young person to join the extremist group and examining possible alternatives that could meet 
them outside of the group. The areas discussed as part of the Empowerment Conversation can 
be seen in Figure 3. As many of these young people are looking for a sense of belonging and 
friendships, part of the discussion could revolve around which legal and socially acceptable 
activities or groups could become an alternative. Ultimately, the point is to “look forward… 
to stimulate the reorientation and alteration of behaviour.”43 
Although originally designed for the police to conduct these conversations, the success 
of these conversations led to an expansion of the program. Teachers, counselors, social 
workers, and other professionals were trained in how to optimize these conversations, which 
allowed a larger number of at-risk youth who were involved in far-right activity to receive 
interventions. Additionally, with a parent’s consent, information on the young adult and the 
specifics of their case would be shared with other agencies “to help the child through 
coordinated efforts.”44 This permission is required because – unlike in the U.S. where 
information can often be shared between agencies and interagency cooperation is encouraged 
 
41 Vidhya Ramalingam and Henry Tuck, “The Need to Exit Programmes: Why Deradicalization and 
Disengagement Matters in the UK’s Approach to Far-Right Violence,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 
September 2014, 8. https://www.counterextremism.org/download_file/363/134/682/  
42 Tore Bjørgo and Yngve Carlsson, “Early Intervention with Violent and Racist Youth Groups,” Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs (Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt), no. 677, 2005, 95-96. 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/27305/677.pdf.  
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– there are “strict rules of confidentiality practiced by social agencies.”45 
Although there are not comprehensive statistics for the entire country’s use of 
Empowerment Conversations, there is one example that demonstrates how effective the 
program can be. The Norwegian city of Kristiansand, located on the southern coast with a 
population around 75,000, became a breeding ground in the mid-1990s for groups of teenaged 
boys with extreme far-right views.46 Several different programs, including those developed 
within Project Exit were dispatched to the city to deal with the growing problem. Beginning 
in 1996, a task force comprised of police, teachers, social workers, and youth officials utilized 
the Empowerment Conversation tactic to attempt to deradicalize and disengagement a group 
of 38 young people who were actively involved in the far-right extremist movement.47 Within 
five years, twenty-nine of those participants were living what is described as “relatively 
normal lives,” three of the participants were dead from accidents or drug-related overdoses, 
and only six remained actively participating in neo-Nazi groups.48 The group of participants 
had expanded by the end of 2001 to include 60 different young people, with 49 of them 
having disengaged and deradicalized – a rate of 82%. Like the parental networks, it is difficult 
to state conclusively that participation in Empowerment Conversations were the main reason 
that individuals chose to deradicalize and disengage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 ibid  
46 Demant, Slootman, Buijs, and Tillie, 161 
47 Bjørgo and Carlsson, 96.  
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Effectiveness of the Project Exit in Norway and What It Means for Current Right-Wing 
Extremism 
The Norwegian government considers Project Exit to be a success, and there is clearly 
evidence that the program – as well as its component parts – to suport that narrative. As 
described previously, there was some demonstrable success stories; seemingly, if individuals 
participated in part of the program, they left far-right extremist groups in high rates. 
Additionally, as Figure 449 demonstrates, the number of individuals that the police had contact 
with who were judged to be members to be members of these groups dropped precipitously 
after Project Exit began. In 1996, 68 people from the selected seven areas were identified and 
by 1999, that number had dropped to 15 – a 78% decrease.50  
Norway’s exit program focused on young adults, making early intervention the top 
 
49 Prosjext Exit: Sluttrapport, 35. 
50 ibid 
POLICE CONTACTS WITH FAR-RIGHT INDIVIDUALS  
(FIGURE 4) 
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priority. Bjørgo credits this early intervention as “one of the main reasons why the neo-Nazi 
scene in Norway [remained] relatively small, young, and charaterised by short careers and 
few veterans’”51 in 2002. However, even then, there was a recognition that the program had 
far less success when the targeted participants were older. That may be one of the reasons that 
“right-wing extremism is no longer a typical youth problem anymore,” but instead these 
groups “are now almost exclusively constituted by adults.”52  
Indeed, Norway’s most shocking and heinous right-wing violence in the last decade 
came from 32-year-old Anders Behring Breivik who killed 77 people by setting off a car 
bomb and conducting a shooting massacre at the annual youth summer camp of the governing 
Labor Party.53 Breivik had all of the characteristics that Project Exit sought to identify and 
address, yet he was well past the targeted age for a parental intervention or an Empowerment 
Conversation. His act also came seemingly “out of the blue” in Norway, which had seen “very 
limited militant right-wing extremist activity or violence” since 2002.54 However, could his 
behavior have been an indication of growing right-wing extremism in Norway? 
While, there are indications that there right-wing thinking is making a comeback 
through anti-immigrant, anti-Islam, and white power groups and political parties, initial 
evidence points to these groups being all hat and no cattle. While groups like the Stop 
Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) and Pegda Norway have active online presences, even large 
groups can “only muster a few dozens for public demonstration” because of a fear of both 
counter-protestors and being identified and stigmatized as being a part of the group.55 
Additionally, in interviews with leaders of current far-right groups, Tore Bjørgo and Ingvild 
 
51 Bjørgo, “Exit Neo-Nazism: Reducing Recruitment and Promoting Disengagement from Racist Groups,” 22-
23. 
52 Tore Bjørgo, “Right-Wing Extremism in Norway: Changes and Challenges,”UiO: C-REX – Center for 
Research on Extremism, 25 Feb 2019, https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/right-
wing-extremism-in-norway.html 
53 Sindre Bangstad, “Don’t Look Now: Can Norway reckon with the reality of right-wing extremists?” World 
Policy Journal, 35 no. 2 (Summer 2018), 34. 
54 Tore Bjørgo and Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik, Right-Wing Extremists and anti-Islam Activists in Norway: 
Constraints against Violence, Norwegian Police University College and Center for Research on Extremism 
(C-REX), Oslo: University of Oslo (2017), 2. 
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Magnæs Gjelsvik found that today’s groups are “far more restrained” in justifying violence 
today than similar groups were in the 1990s.56 However,  Bjørgo and Gjelsvik also point out 
that there are holes in this recent work – including a lack of interviews with participants in the 
most violent neo-Nazi groups, which could change some of the conclusions they draw. Going 
forward, it will be important to watch these groups to determine if their propensity for 
violence increases. If it does, researchers and practitioners may need to revisit Project Exit for 
use with an older population.   
 
Sweden Tackles Disengagement and Deradicalization 
 
If Norway’s problem with neo-Nazi and extremist far-right groups were relatively small and 
often concentrated in disorganized groups of teenaged boys, Sweden’s problem was far larger 
and more organized. Sweden had a long history with organized Nazi movements dating back 
to 1924, and although the ideology suffered in the wake of the German defeat in World War 
II, it rebounded in 1956 with the founding of Nordiska rikspartiet (NRP), which became “the 
institution that collected, developed and restructured the ideas, experiences and aims of the 
pre-war and wartime Nazi movements to create the contemporary Nazi movements, in the 
form of subcultural groups and parties.”57 In the intervening years, the Nazi movement and 
took two separate paths – one part of the group focused on addressing immigration and 
developed the Bevara Sverige Svenskt (Keep Sweden Swedish) group that was adopted a 
“cultural racist view,” the other “remained faithful to the Nazi ideology.”58  
By the 1980s and 1990s, the neo-Nazi groups in Sweden were increasingly militant 
and violent in their ideologies and had committed a number of high-profile violent crimes. 
Where Norway’s neo-Nazi movement was often considered to have only about 100-150 
 
56 ibid, 15-16. 
57 Christer Mattsson and Thomas Johansson, “Becoming, belonging and leaving – Exit processes among young 
neo-Nazis in Sweden,” Journal for Deradicalization 16, (Fall 2018), 36. 
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active members – possibly as many as 300 in its heyday – Sweden had close to 3,000.59  
With supporters well into the thousands, a larger concern was the group of hangers-on 
and sympathizers that the neo-Nazi groups were able to attract within the country, expanding 
the number those with neo-Nazi extremist ties by thousands. In fact, the groups attracted 
enough followers that researchers and observers classified them as part of a “movement” 
rather than a more nebulous ideology. The strength of the movement also means that it is 
“sufficiently strong and intimidating to provide some protection against outside enemies,” 
including the authorities.60 In their examination of why young people join and leave racist 
groups, Tore Bjørgo and Yngve Carlsson additionally point to the “big and profitable ‘home 
market’” that allows for the groups to attract individuals with a wide variety of skills, which 
in turn creates an “elaborate organizational, economical and media infrastructure” that is 
“socially attractive” for young people.61 The attractiveness of the movement is also a clear 
differentiator as compared to the neo-Nazi scene in Norway, where social and familial shame 
and embarrassment around participation in far-right extremist ideologies was possibly one of 
the factors that kept their movement small and relatively limited to youthful participants.  
In Sweden, the attractiveness of the movement combined with the economic 
opportunities within the movement attracted better educated and less socially isolated 
individuals. This was not a movement of mal-adjusted, social misfits, rather, Sweden’s scene 
featured skilled participants like “computer specialists, academics, [and] university 
students.”62 Consequently, there was room for growth within the movement, as well as the 
ability for younger participants to age within the movement. A significant portion of 
Sweden’s extreme right-wing movement are in “their twenties or thirties and have already 
been involved in the movement for ten years or more.”63 The age of participants – and the 
extended time they have been involved in the movement – presents a number of challenges 
 
59 Bjørgo, “Exit Neo-Nazism: Reducing Recruitment and Promoting Disengagement from Racist Groups,” 5. 
60 Bjørgo and Carlsson, 13.  
61 Bjørgo and Carlsson, 12. 
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63 Demant, Slootman, Buijs, and Tillie, 163. 
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for authorities looking to quash neo-Nazi organizations. Because there are many veterans of 
the group, authorities have a difficult time creating a leadership vacuum, with the idea that 
this would ultimately lead to the groups dissolving. Instead, when leaders are put into prison, 
“there are plenty of alternative leaders to take over.”64  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth of Immigrants, Neo-Nazi Groups, and Racist Attacks 
While there are a number of reasons that violent, neo-Nazi ideology seemed to grow 
during this period, there is a clearly a correlation between the increasing number of migrants 
and refugees admitted into the country and the growth and strengthening of these groups. As 
Figure 5 demonstrates, the number of immigrants grew dramatically between 1987 and 
1993.65  
As the number of immigrants grew, so did the number of serious, violent attacks on 
the population. In 1993, there were 787 police cases “where circumstances indicated that the  
motive behind the crime was political, xenophobic or racist in nature,” an increase from the 
 
64 Bjørgo and Carlsson, 13 
65 Heléne Lööw, “Racist Violence and Criminal Behavior in Sweden: Myths and Reality,” In Terror From The 
Extreme Right, edited by Tore Bjørgo. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1995, 130. 
SOURCE: HELÉNE LÖÖW, “RACIST VIOLENCE AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR IN 
SWEDEN: MYTHS AND REALITY.” 
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359 reported crimes in 1992 police reports.66    
Unsurprisingly, during this time, there is a relationship between the number of racist 
and xenophobic crimes and the amount of neo-Nazi activity reported in the county. In 1993, 
the four counties with the highest number of crimes with racist motives – Stockholm (223 
crimes), Västernorrland (92 crimes), Dalarna (72 crimes), and Västra Götaland (72 crimes), 
only Västernorrland had extremist activity rated as something other than “high” – its activity 
was rated as negligible.67 Interestingly, and unexplainably, Västernorrland’s data is similar to 
the other countries in the northern part of Sweden where racist violence and far-right activity 
do not seem to be related.   
 
The Creation of an Exit Program  
It is with the background of changing demographics and a growing threat of right-
wing extremist violence, that Sweden’s Exit program was born. With the Norwegian Exit 
program in its infancy but showing signs of promise, the leaders of the program latched onto 
the idea of spreading similar programs to surrounding areas with a demonstrated need. In 
1996, the Norwegian leaders attended a conference with representatives from Fryshuset, a 
Swedish NGO.68 Fryshuset, founded in the fall of 1984 in conjunction with the YMCA, had 
already cemented itself as a cultural space for young adults that promoted “empowerment and 
tolerance by building social relations and interactions,” while maintaining that it was open to 
all who wished to participate in its activities that often range from sports to music and 
everything in between.69   
In addition to building relationships with Fryshuset, the leaders of the Norwegian Exit 
program, made sure to get buy-in from Kent Lindahl, a former neo-Nazi who had left the 
extremist ideology in the early 1990s and had begun traveling to Swedish schools with Jewish 
 
66 ibid, 133-134.  
67 ibid, 136.  
68 Maria Alvanou, “Swedish EXIT and international De-radicalization programs,” Pemptousia, 3 April 2015, 
https://pemptousia.com/2015/04/swedish-exit-and-international-de-radicalization-programs-interview-with-
the-inspiring-expert-robert-orell/. 
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Holocaust survivors in the hopes of discouraging young people from joining similar groups. 70 
Lindahl was intrigued by both the program and its success, and Exit in Sweden was formally 
established in 1998.  
While keeping the same goals of deradicalizing and disengaging individuals involved 
in neo-Nazi and other far-right extremist groups as the Norwegian version, Sweden’s program 
had two major differences: the program would focus on individuals that reached out 
themselves for help in exiting violent groups (rather than the program doing the proactive 
outreach) and a large percentage of the leadership of the program would not be researchers 
and other similar professionals, but former members of the far-right ideology. The two 
programmatic differences were intended to grow credibility and increase the likelihood of 
success. If the Exit program was only working with individuals who had, themselves, reached 
out for help in leaving the violent ideology, there was a greater chance that they were serious 
about making the necessary changes in their lives. As previously described, Sweden’s neo-
Nazi groups were relatively powerful, so there was a chance that someone looking to leave 
the group would be in physical danger; there are a number of case studies that support 
violence committed by Neo-Nazi groups after former members have defected or committed 
“treason.”71  therefore, it was unlikely someone would risk bodily injury only to change their 
mind. The inclusion of former neo-Nazis as leaders in the program lent the program 
credibility with potential participants. Additionally, these former extremists were more easily 
able to “establish contact with youths who are considering disengaging from the 
movement.”72  
 
The Five-Step Process 
Because participation was predicated on an interested individual reaching out to Exit 
Sweden, there was less of a need in this program, as opposed to the Norwegian program, to 
 
70 Bjørgo, “Exit Neo-Nazism: Reducing Recruitment and Promoting Disengagement from Racist Groups,” 23.  
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demonstrate that there was life outside of the extremist group or to convince the individual 
that leaving was even an option. Therefore, the program set out to address the “practical, 
social, and emotional” needs of their participants and developed a five step process to do so.73 
This process, as seen in Figure 6, helps to walk an individual through the entire 
disengagement and deradicalization process with a realization that it is likely that it will take 
between six to twelve months, if not longer.  
 
SWEDEN EXIT PROCESS (FIGURE 6)74 
 
 
It is important to emphasize that staff within the program do not address ideology or 
attempt to challenge the beliefs of far-right extremist groups. According to literature on the 
program, the reason that staff avoid challenging extremist ideology directly is that the groups 
“school their members with all the relevant counter-arguments so this can be a futile approach 
 
73 “English Summary, Exit: A follow-up and evaluation of the organization for people wishing to leave racist and 
nazi groups,” Stockholm: National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ), 2001, 46. 
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to take and simply put the young person into defensive mode.”75 Rather, the focus is on 
reintegrating individuals back into society, while providing them with the mental and 
financial support required to turn away from their former lives.  
Because the push and pull of involvement with extremist ideologies is rarely an easy 
string to sever, individuals often oscillate between steps. The progression of disengagement 
and deradicalization usually does not follow a linear path, and instead involves “relapses into 
old patterns of behaviour and thought” that may cause an individual to revert back to previous 
phases for a time period.76 This constant struggle and potential backsliding for individuals 
leaving extremism is one of the main reasons that Exit Sweden emphasizes the necessity of 
building a relationship between an exiting individual and their coach (as described in the five 
step process in Figure 6). A key part of this client/coach relationship is the participation in 
interactions and activities outside of the extremist groups, which help “the client [in] coping 
in new settings and entering different worlds.”77 The coach’s presence in these situations not 
only provides support in navigating situations that an individual may not have experienced 
since joining a neo-Nazi group, but also can be used to discuss the interactions at a later time 
to determine what other support might be necessary. Especially in the early days of 
disengagement, a coach and staff from the Exit program are available twenty-four hours a day 
to step in at a moment’s notice, often taking the place of family and friends that have left 
behind.  
Coaches are an integral part to the success or failure of Exit Sweden’s program; 
therefore, training them to best help their clients is an important part of how the program is 
designed. Because many of these coaches are former members of extreme far-right groups 
themselves, an early part of the program is teaching them how to relate to their clients in the 
most successful way. More experienced coaches and professional counselors help new 
 
75 “Case Study Report: EXIT Fryshuset, Sweden,” Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 1998, 
https://www.counterextremism.org/download_file/90/134/63/  
76 Tina Wilchen Christensen, “A Question of Participation – Disengagement from the Extremist Right: A case 
study of Sweden,” (PhD diss., Roskilde University, October 2015), 82. 
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coaches break down issues that their clients may have “by deconstructing a situation into 
small pieces, making it possible to see how A might lead to B.”78 As individuals leaving 
extremist groups are learning how to reintegrate into society and social situations, one of the 
most important messages of coaches and the Exit program in general is that they have the 
ability to influence situations – ultimately, that these experiences do not have a predetermined 
conclusion. Coaches learn how to communicate through these situations, but ultimately to 
realize that each individual is different and what works with one person leaving extremist 
groups may not translate directly to someone else.  
Like all forms of therapy, the Exit program is not an exact science and coaches act as 
an important point by which the program can be tailored. However, coaches may face 
negative effects from participating in the program if the individual that they are working with 
more quickly goes through the phases of deradicalization and disengagement than the coach 
did or if situations with their client cause them to backslide. As discussed, disengagement and 
deradicalization is not a linear path and coaches – even those that have been removed from 
their former extremist group for long periods of time – can be at risk. The European 
Commission’s examination of the Exit program emphasizes this possibility and details the 
possible need to have a chain of coaches that are available if a client surpasses their coach in 
their process.79  
 
Support Outside of The Five Step Process 
Even though Exit Sweden focuses the majority of its resources on therapies, support, 
and programs that directly interface with individuals leaving violent right-wing extremist 
groups, Exit Sweden does provide assistance in other areas, as well. Although they do not 
play as large a role as the program in Norway, Sweden’s Exit program has a supporting 
 
78 ibid, 148.  
79 “Swedish method of working with formers in Exit work,” European Commission, 2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7415_en.  
  
 
 
 
 
Casie Daugherty: Deradicalization and Disengagement: Exit Programs in Norway and 
Sweden and Addressing Neo-Nazi Extremism 
 
 
 
 
246 
program for parents in the Klippan area.80 Additionally, parents unable to receive assistance 
through that can turn to the Exit program itself for help in understanding both the nature of the 
group that their child has been a part of as well as how they should approach their children 
and how they can be supportive during the disengagement and deradicalization process. 
Specifically, Exit offers services ranging from helping to “convene meetings between the 
family and a range of service providers… [and] assist with police contact and protection 
where the family has been threatened by the group.”81 
In addition to providing direct support to family members, Exit also provides 
resources to professionals that come into contact with young people of how to understand 
neo-Nazi groups, their ideology, and the warning signs that an individual may be at risk for 
joining such a group or has recently joined one. These targeted professionals include teachers, 
counselors, police, and social services workers, and the program goes as far as to teach them 
how to reach out to individuals within the movements and conduct case work to support them 
if they decide to disengage from their current activities.82 According to data from Exit’s 
program, these resources and lectures are in such high demand that in 2001 they were turning 
down roughly a quarter of all requests because they did not have the necessary staff to 
complete them.83 By 2001, Exit had supplied resources or conducted lectures on 179 
occasions – the majority of them – 63% - at institutions of higher education.84  
 
Exit Motala 
In addition to the Exit Sweden program, which is sometimes referred to Exit 
Stockholm or Exit Fryshuset in current literature, there is a similar program in Motala 
 
80 “English Summary, Exit: A follow-up and evaluation of the organization for people wishing to leave racist and 
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(referred to subsequently as Exit Motala) that was founded in 1999. Exit Motala diverges in a 
number of ways from Exit Sweden that make comparisons between them virtually 
meaningless. Instead of focusing exclusively on individuals leaving neo-Nazi organizations, 
Exit Motala also has programs for “marginalised young immigrants from violent groups… 
[and] asylum seekers.”85 The program geared towards immigrants and asylum seekers, called 
Amir, was expanded in 2002.86 Notably, though it has separate programs for those leaving 
right-wing extremism, immigrants, asylum seekers, and women who are involved in neo-Nazi 
groups, Exit Motala does make an effort to integrate the groups in as many activities as they 
can.  
Additionally, their goals are much broader. Though deradicalization and 
disengagement is, of course, a key focus, they also highlight the “promotion of democratic 
principles” and “combating of racism and marginalization.”87 By highlighting these 
components, Exit Motala had virtually abandoned the principle of Exit Sweden to not engage 
on ideology. Although the two programs initially worked very closely together, by late 2001 
any cooperation had virtually ceased. In addition to the ideological differences between Exit 
Motala and Exit Sweden, there was a “bitter dispute” between leaders of the programs.88 
Anita Bjargvide, a social worker who had taken over Exit Motala, accused Exit Sweden of 
“lacking proper oversight” that was leading to fraud including a deliberate inflation of the 
number of people it had helped to leave neo-Nazi groups in order for the government to 
increase its funding levels.89 After the split, Exit Motala has been run with government funds.  
 
Exit Sweden’s Success 
Like with most programs that receive government funding, the Swedish government 
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ordered an evaluation of the program to determine its efficacy and whether continued funding 
was warranted. The Swedish Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) was tasked with the 
evaluation after three years of Exit Sweden’s work with extreme far-right groups in 2001. 
According to the BRÅ’s evaluation, over 90 percent of the individuals that passed through 
Exit Sweden were young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, statistics that 
were consistent with the overall make-up of far-right groups.90  
By this time, approximately 133 individuals hadgone through Exit Sweden – and the 
vast majority were considered to be successful disengagement and deradicalizations. As 
demonstrated in Figure 7, 125 of the 133 individuals had left far-right extremist groups – a 94 
percent success rate.91 However, it is important to highlight that five of the individuals that 
were considered to be successful had been involved in the program for less than one month. 
Therefore, it is very difficult to truly say that they have completely disengaged and 
deradicalized; a reexamination of their situations after the passage of more time is warranted. 
Overall, out of the 125 individuals who left neo-Nazi groups, five had been part of the 
program for less than one month; thirty for between one and six months; 50 between seven 
months and a year; and fifteen for between fourteen months and three years.92 Because each 
individual attempting to separate himself (or herself) from right-wing extremist groups has a 
different path, it is impossible to draw any conclusions from how long a person participates in 
Exit. Just because someone has been involved for three years does not necessarily mean that 
they have made progress the entire time and have reached the Stabilization Phase, just as 
someone who has only been involved for six months cannot necessarily be assumed to be in 
one of the earlier phases. As previously discussed, individuals can vacillate between phases; 
even when they are almost completely disengaged, they may suffer setbacks that send them 
spiraling back several phases. Therefore, using an individual’s length of time in the Exit 
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Sweden program is not a particularly useful gauge of success or even of progress. The data 
gathered by the BRÅ does have some interesting statistics on when individuals (who are 
considered to have successfully disengaged and deradicalized) first reached out to Exit for 
help and on what phase they reported to be on when they left the program, as not all 
individuals stay in contact with the program through all of the phases. While the vast majority 
of these individuals – 83 out of 133 – reach out to Exit while they are in the first two steps of 
the process, 16 individuals began their engagement with the Exit program after they had 
already completed the initial steps of removing themselves from the far-right ideology and 
joined the program during the Settling Phase (phase three) or later.93 Additionally, most 
individuals left Exit during the latter half of the program, with 42 leaving during the 
Reflection Phase (phase four) and 25 during the Stabilization Phase (phase five). This would 
seem to indicate that individuals who began the program stayed to work through many of the 
phases. However, there is no information about whether those that left later in the program 
joined during later phases, leaving open the possibility that some joined during the third phase 
and the left during the fourth phase.  
 
 
93 ibid, 25.  
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 While the program seems to have been successful in the first several years of its 
existence, evaluating data from a longer period of time it useful for gauging the long-term 
viability of the program. Robert Ӧrell, the Assistant Director of Exit Sweden, provided 
general data in 2008, which incorporates ten years of the program’s existence. He said that the 
program had served around 600 individuals and that only two were known to them as having 
SOURCE: EMMA DISLEY, KRISTIN WEED, ANAÏS 
REDING, LINDSAY CLUTTERBUCK, AND RICHARD 
WARNES, “INDIVIDUAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM AL 
QA’IDA-INFLUENCED TERRORIST GROUPS: A RAPID 
EVIDENCE ASSESSMENT TO INFORM POLICY AND 
PRACTICE IN PREVENTING TERRORISM.” 
  
 
 
 
 
Casie Daugherty: Deradicalization and Disengagement: Exit Programs in Norway and 
Sweden and Addressing Neo-Nazi Extremism 
 
 
 
 
251 
returned to the far-right extremist movement.94 However, more in-depth information on yearly 
statistics, specifically those of a similar nature to the BRÅ are unavailable. The only data that 
is available details how many new cases by year Exit Sweden had from 2005 – 2009, with 
additional data on individuals that were still receiving services or after-program support. 
Generally, the number of new cases per year ranged from between 25 and 50, with the highest 
number of new cases occurring in 2006 (51) and the lowest occurring in 2007 and 2009 (26 
each).95 Without more details and information on new individuals that joined and left the 
program after 2001, it is difficult to analyze whether the program continued to have the same 
high rates of success that it enjoyed in its first three years of existence. Additionally, more 
information is needed to ensure that those individuals classified as successfully having 
disengaged and deradicalized in 2001 continued on that path or rejoined their former 
movements.    
 
The Challenges and Failures of Exit Sweden  
As detailed above, one of the most significant challenges in judging how successful 
the Exit Sweden program was after its initial three-year evaluation is the lack of specific data 
sets. The lack of data can be traced directly to Sweden’s Personal Data Act, which prevents 
storing detailed, sensitive data.96 Non-governmental organizations, including Exit, are not 
allowed to “maintain a database of their former clients’ home or work addresses;”97 instead, 
they are permitted only to use a client’s “name, birth year, and what county they are from or 
 
94 Tore Bjørgo, Jaap van Donselaar, and Sara Grunenberg, “Exit from right-wing extremist groups: lessons from 
disengagement programmes in Norway, Sweden and Germany,” In Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and 
collective disengagement, edited by Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan. New York: Routledge, 2009, 39. 
95 Anna-Lena Lodenius, “Utredning av Exit-projektet,” In Utvärdering av EXIT – Fryshusets 
avhopparverksamhet: Delrapport kring insatser för unga som vill lämna gruppa som använder våld och hot 
för att nå politiska mål,  Stockholm: Ungdomsstyrelsen (2010), 12. 
https://www2.ungdomsstyrelsen.se/butiksadmin/showDoc/ff80808127e2ac190128babe13ef003c/w  
96 Anna-Lena Lodenius, “To leave a destructive life full of hate: The Story of Exit in Sweden,” trans. Tanya 
Silverman, Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2010), 18. https://annalenalod.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/exit-
evaluation-2010-lodenius.pdf 
97 Jessica Eve Stern, “X: A Case Study of a Swedish Neo-Nazi and His Reintegration into Swedish Society,” 
Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 32 no. 3 (May/June 2014), 440-453. 
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reside in.”98 This clearly presents a barrier to following up with former clients and 
determining how well they have maintained their disengaged status. The lack of data prevents 
both internal and external evaluations of the overall program and its specific parts, which 
could lead to changes that improve the efficacy of the program. While protecting the personal 
data of citizens is a noble and worthwhile goal, in this case it interferes with auditing the 
program and decisions on funding the program would be made with only partial, unverifiable 
data. 
Because the program deals with sensitive topics and potentially violent situations, it is 
important that it is able to maintain dedicated, well-trained staff. High staff turnover was one 
of the main problems flagged by the 2001 BRÅ evaluation, particularly as more than half of 
the thirteen staff members that had been hired in the program’s first three years had left the 
program before the end of 2001, including all the staff members hired from July 1998 through 
the end of 2000.99 The report points out that turnover of this magnitude is not unusual for an 
organization “established by committed enthusiasts”100 and that their administrative 
inexperience is often the cause. However, high staff turnover hampered the program’s 
attempts to expand, and increased participation in the program – as new individuals join and 
existing clients continue to work through the phases – would likely exacerbate the issue. The 
very characteristics that give the program such credibility, particularly the presence of staff 
with their own experiences with far-right extremist groups can be one of the very issues that 
causes the program to fail because they do not have the experience to lead or manage staff. 
Finding a balance between the two is clearly a key in a successful continuation of the 
program, but it is unclear how – or if – the organization addressed this issue.  
The program also had serious issues with mismanagement and misappropriation of 
funds. As previously discussed, the leader of the Exit Motala program had made allegations 
into consequences from the lack of oversight of Exit Sweden, and her allegations bore fruit in 
 
98 Lodenius, “To leave a destructive life full of hate: The Story of Exit in Sweden,” 18.  
99 “Exit för avhoppare: En uppföljning och utvärdering av verksamheten åren 1998-2001,” 15.  
100 Bjørgo and Carlsson, 73. 
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2002 when Kent Lindahl, one of the founders of Exit Sweden was stripped of his control over 
the program’s funds after the disappearance of a substantial sum of money.101 Lindahl was 
forced to pay back 60,000 Swedish Krona that had mysteriously vanished from Exit’s funds – 
allegedly taken from the 1.6 million SEK that the program had received in government grants 
that year.102 Additionally, material donations and technical equipment were found to be 
missing from the program and the combination of these issues led to an organizational 
shakeup whereby Exit Sweden was “reorganized under the umbrella of the Fryshuset youth 
foundation.”103 However, this reorganization did not make substantial changes to the program 
to ensure that similar behaviors were not repeated or that the risks of hiring former extremists 
– no matter how deradicalized – were mitigated.  
With the program’s inability – or unwillingness – to address the risks of hiring former 
members of extremist groups, it is unsurprising that the Lindahl incident was not the last 
issue. In 2010, Anders Högström was convicted by a Polish court for the theft of the “Arbeit 
Macht Frei” sign from the Nazi camp at Auschwitz.104 Högström had served in a leadership 
capacity for the Exit Motala program.105 Notably, with Högström and Lindahl, the Swedish 
exit programs, had two high-profile failures through their use of former extremists that the 
Norwegian programs did not have. Clearly, not every former extremist that participated in the 
program committed a serious violation, it is, nevertheless, fair to question whether the 
inclusion of these individuals increased the risks associated with the program. 
 
 
 
101 Peter Karlsson and Catherine Larsson, “Ledaren får inte ha hand om Exits pengar,” Aftonbladet, 26 February 
2002. https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/218Xgl/ledaren-far-inte-ha-hand-om-exits-pengar 
102 ibid 
103 Daniel Koehler, Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, tools and programs for countering violent 
extremism, New York: Routledge (2017), 192. 
104 Tony Paterson, “Former neo-Nazi jailed for Auschwitz sign theft,” Independent, 31 December 2010, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/former-neo-nazi-jailed-for-auschwitz-sign-theft-
2172533.html. 
105 Kelly Berkell, “Off-Ramp Opportunities in Material Support Cases,” Harvard National Security Journal, 8 
issue 1 (2017), 33. 
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Conclusion 
 
Although Norway and Sweden developed their disengagement and deradicalization programs 
at virtually the same time, the demographics and size of their neo-Nazi populations were 
vastly different and led to significant differences between the programs – though relatively 
similar outcomes. The age of the populations they were addressing seems to be one of the key 
factors in necessitating different programmatic structures – Norway’s younger population 
allowed for interventions focused on parental networks and discussions of future 
opportunities, while Sweden’s older neo-Nazi population required a five-step process built 
around the needs of young adults. How the program identified potential participants was also 
dissimilar and may be traced to the age of the population, as well. Exit Sweden required 
proactive outreach on the part of an individual wishing to leave far-right extremism, possibly 
because the group that it served were all adults and would be resistant to leaving if they were 
approached by outside forces. Finally, the staffing of the two programs took divergent 
approaches. While Norway’s program focused on professionals, like teachers, social workers, 
and researchers, Sweden’s program was mainly staffed and led by former members of neo-
Nazi groups that had, themselves, disengaged and deradicalized. This difference is personnel 
can be seen in how the programs are structured and how they walk their participants through 
the process.  
Both programs, however, are structured to address all of the needs – mental and 
physical – of people departing from extremist groups. Recognizing that there are often unmet 
needs that drive individuals to join these groups, both the Norwegian and Swedish programs 
help disengaged persons to realize that they can meet these needs outside of the group. Both 
programs place a heavy emphasis on educational and social support, which can allow 
individuals to become fully functioning members of society. Though there is no religious 
component to the far-right extremist groups, the Exit programs are constituted in a similar 
manner to those that address religious extremism. This is demonstrated by the expansion of 
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the Exit Sweden into addressing issues of asylum seekers and immigrants who are at risk of 
radicalization in different ways.  
The available data indicates that both programs were demonstrably successful in 
addressing deradicalization and disengagement for their targeted populations with high 
success rates. However, there are lingering concerns for both programs. Because the 
Norwegian Exit program was short-lived, the available data on what happened to its 
participants is virtually non-existent. Additionally, as the program lasted for only several 
years and the problem of right-wing radicalism was judged to be taken care of, it seems to 
have left a void that has allowed the problem to once again resurface. The Norwegian 
government may be well served by examining if a similar program would be helpful once 
again. Like Norway, the evidence surrounding Exit Sweden shows very positive results, but 
the overall data is very limited by the country’s personal data protection laws. These laws 
hamper efforts to follow up with individuals who have been a part of the program in the past 
to see if they are maintain their deradicalized status. The use of former extremists within the 
program has also caused significant issues in the past and a reorganization of the program did 
not seek to address many of these concerns. 
Collectively, the Exit programs in Sweden and Norway seemed to have paved the way 
for deradicalization programs across the globe, and  lessons can be learned from these 
programs, including how to tailor the programs best for populations of different ages and how 
the use of former extremists can build credibility for a program and entice members to leave 
those groups. There is certainly a need for more data on these programs, even though aspects 
of them may not have been in existence for more than fifteen years, as it is important to 
examine whether individuals who deradicalized and disengaged using these programs were 
able to maintain their status even after support by the program was limited or stopped 
completely. 
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